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But Still Enthusiastic: The Unchanged Europeanness  
of the Spanish Parliamentary Elite 
During the Eurozone Crisis  
Juan Rodríguez-Teruel, José Real-Dato & Miguel Jerez∗ 
Abstract: »Immer noch begeistert: Die unveränderte Europäizität der spani-
schen parlamentarischen Elite während der Eurozonen-Krise«. Since the adhe-
sion of Spain to the EEC in 1986, the Spanish electorate has shown a high level 
of support for the European integration process. Even more enthusiastic than 
their fellow citizens, Spanish political elites also expressed a strong commit-
ment to the European integration project, based in a pro-EU consensus beyond 
party and ideological divides. However, Spain has also been one of the coun-
tries most affected by the economic and financial crisis that has hit the EU (par-
ticularly the Eurozone) since 2010. The main questions we aim to answer in this 
paper is whether this crisis and its management by EU institutions has eroded the 
traditional support for the EU shown by Spanish domestic political elites and, if 
so, to what extent. To this end, we draw on survey data provided by the InTune 
and ENEC-2014 projects on the attitudes of Spanish MPs towards the EU in the 
years 2007, 2009, and 2014. Results show that the traditional pro-EU stance of 
Spanish MPs has remained mostly stable during the crisis, yet such stability has 
increased the representation gap with citizens in this area. 
Keywords: Political elites, European integration, attitudes, European Union, Eu-
roscepticism, Europeanness, Spain. 
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1.  Introduction1 
The financial crisis started in 2008 has produced enormous consequences in the 
political life of the Southern European democracies. Scholars have detected ero-
sion of citizens’ support to political institutions and the main political actors, 
particularly, mainstream political parties (Mair 2013; Cordero and Simón 2015; 
Teixeira et al. 2016). As a consequence, an ‘electoral epidemic’ has profoundly 
altered party systems, damaging the social basis of traditional political parties and 
pushing new challenger actors to parliaments and governments at different levels 
(Bosco and Verney 2012; Hernández and Kriesi 2016). Spain has been one out-
standing example of this transformation, which has brought new parties like 
Podemos or Ciudadanos to the political landscape (Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio, 
2015; Rodriguez-Teruel et al. 2016). These changes have affected not only na-
tional institutions but also the traditional support to the European Union (EU), 
which in turn has fostered the raise of populist forces that question the role of 
states in the European integration. Hence, an increase of critical attitudes of the 
national political elites towards the EU in these countries could be spreading 
among voters, and damaging indeed the traditional elite consensus on Europe. 
This article aims to analyse the consequences of this political turbulence on 
the Europeanness of the Spanish parliamentary elite. Spain has been traditionally 
one of the more pro-European countries even before its accession to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 (Sanchez-Cuenca 2001; Szmolka 2007). 
This consistency of political attitudes towards Europe has been particularly strong 
among domestic elites, beyond party and ideological divides (Jerez et al. 2010; 
Jerez et al. 2015a). However, Spain has also been one of the countries that has 
most dramatically experienced the consequences of both the economic and finan-
cial debt crisis since 2008. This has been accompanied by a deterioration of the 
support to the EU amongst the population. Previous works have suggested that 
this did not occur with the national political elite in the beginning of the crisis 
period (Sojka et al. 2015; Freire and Moury 2015). This article’s main question is 
whether things have changed with the subsequent deepening of the economic 
crisis. To check the evolution of the attitudes of Spanish political elites towards 
the EU, we will examine survey data collected at three different time points: 
2007, 2009 and 2014. 
Our main expectation is that continuity might prevail over change during the 
observed period, in line with the continuity that has also characterised composi-
tion of the parliamentary elite (Jerez et al. 2016). Indeed, given the traditional 
                                                             
1  The authors would like to thank the financial support from the Real Instituto Elcano and the 
Department of Political Science of the University of Granada. Also, the authors thank Dr. 
Ignacio Molina, from the Real Instituto Elcano for facilitating the collaboration of this or-
ganization, and Rafael Camacho and Luis Blanca, for their competent work during the 
fieldwork of the ENEC project. 
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pro-EU consensus shared by the main political parties (the Popular Party, PP, and 
the Socialist Party, PSOE), the absence of relevant party system changes in the 
period we cover would contribute to keep the elite attitudes towards the EU under 
stable patterns. Despite the impact of the Eurozone crisis, until 2015 the main 
features of the Spanish party system were very stable. Although the 2011 general 
election produced a serious collapse of the PSOE vote (which led this party to 
lose the government to the PP), the concentration of the electoral vote and the 
parliamentary representation amongst mainstream parties did not change signifi-
cantly, and those parties with soft Eurosceptic attitudes (Ruiz-Jiménez and Egea 
de Haro 2011) remained a small minority in the national chamber. Consequently, 
we expect to find a stable pattern in the main Europeanness traits of the Spanish 
parliamentary elite, while potential changes in attitudes and opinions could obey 
to party variance rather to elite transformation. In this respect, the article assesses 
to what extent this elite consensus concerning the EU is affected by inter-party 
divisions existing due to the politicization of EU issues at the national level. 
Besides, since these mainstream positions regarding the EU within the elite con-
trast with the change in citizens’ attitudes, a resulting scenario would be an in-
crease in the gap between elite’s opinions and those of the general population, 
eroding the traditional elite-mass congruence in Spain regarding the EU. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The second section reviews the 
main political facts that have shaped the political life in Spain in the last decade, 
paying particular attention to the main issues related to the EU. Then, the third 
section introduces the main concepts, expectations and the data employed in this 
research. Section four analyses the political attitudes regarding the EU in the 
parliamentary elite. And finally, the concluding section summarize the main 
findings and connects patterns observed in the previous section with the changes 
in the Spanish political system occurred since 2014. 
2.  A Turbulent Political Time in Spain  
Although the time span strictly covered by the data used in this paper (2007-
2014) may look too short to expect relevant changes, the Spanish political and 
economic landscape experienced deep transformations. During this period, 
there were three different parliamentary terms with episodes of government 
change, economic instability and social turbulence. Along this time, the refer-
ences to the EU in the Spanish political debate have evolved from the optimism 
during the referendum for the Constitutional treaty in 2005 to the controversy 
in 2012-13 about the policy conditions linked to the bailout of the Spanish 
financial system through the European Stability Mechanism. 
The first government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2008) was 
characterised by a period of strong economic development, in which Spain 
returned to its traditional support to Germany and France as leading actors in 
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the EU, abandoning the transatlantic-oriented policy implemented by the previ-
ous prime minister, José Maria Aznar (Delgado et al. 2015). In this respect, 
Zapatero gave strong relevance to the Spanish role in the process of ratification 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. While in other countries 
the Constitutional Treaty raised eurocriticism and division within the elite, in 
Spain the vote was employed as a legitimacy device for the national govern-
ment. Indeed, Spain was one of the few countries in consulting citizens through 
a referendum before the parliament ratified the document. Despite the clear 
victory of those supporting the project2, a low level of public debate about the 
text (with a resulting low turnout), and an image of consensus and complacen-
cy amongst political elites weakened the political outcome of the referendum3. 
The good results in terms of economic growth and unemployment lead the 
Spanish GDP per capita to surpass Italy by the end of 2007, and fostered good 
prospects to reduce distance between Spain and the main economies of the EU, 
Germany and France. In this context, the positions of soft Eurocriticism in the 
Spanish political elite were mainly related to two concerns (Ruiz-Jiménez and 
Egea de Haro 2011, 117). On the one hand, there was the criticism from small 
radical left parties regarding the lack of attention, from their point of view, to 
social matters in the EU. On the other hand, nationalist parties in Catalonia and 
the Basque country remained sceptical about the weak role of regional repre-
sentation in the EU institutional framework. By 2007, the Spanish citizens 
showed the lowest levels of support to the idea that the Spain had not benefitted 
from belonging to the EU since the access to the CEE in 1986 (Ruiz-Jiménez 
and Egea de Haro 2011, 122). 
The context changed dramatically during Zapatero’s second term (2008-
2011). The burst of the US real-state bubble in autumn 2008, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, had a tremendous effect on the internal situation 
of Spain and its own housing bubble. However, contrary to other European 
countries, the Spanish government adopted a moderate approach against the 
crisis, with discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policies and a Keynesian strat-
egy (increasing the budget deficit to 11.1% of GDP at the end of 2009), while it 
was reluctant to implement serious structural reforms. This helped to maintain 
the public’s confidence in a quick exit from the crisis. But the deterioration of 
the situation in Greece eventually forced the EU to intervene in order to hinder 
the spread of the risk of default to other Southern European countries. Hence, 
in May 2010 Zapatero announced a U-turn change in its policy agenda, with 
                                                             
2  The referendum was held on the 20th of February 2015, with a turnout of 42,32%. The 
constitutional project was backed by 76,7% of the participants. Some weeks later the Con-
greso de los Diputados (the lower house of the parliament) approved the text by 311 votes 
against 10 (0 abstention) as well as the majority of the high chamber did (225 to six votes, 
and one abstention).  
3 “Spains’ mixed EU signals”, BBC news, February 21, 2015 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu 
rope/4284607.stm>. 
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emergency cuts and structural reforms aimed at containing the public deficit 
and avoiding the risk of bailout. In August 2011, PSOE and PP approved an 
amendment to the Spanish Constitution (article 135) introducing a cap on the 
structural deficit of the state. 
While support for the PSOE’s in the opinion polls shrank following this U-
turn in the government’s policies, the new agenda altered the role of the EU in 
the Spanish public debate. The EU institutions started to be identified as the 
promoters of the austerity policy implemented by the government, being also 
blamed as responsible for the consequences that arouse in the following 
months. Hence, some relevant intellectuals argued in favour of leaving the 
euro4, while support for democracy and to the main political institutions de-
clined in parallel to what was happening in Southern European countries 
(Alonso 2013). Political dissatisfaction also fostered social mobilization against 
the government and the political class, like the massive demonstrations across 
Spain held in May 15th 2011, dubbed the 15-M movement, also known as the 
indignados (Fominaya 2015). 
The collapse of the support for the government in the 2011 general election 
gave the victory to the PP and paved the way for a majority government headed 
by Mariano Rajoy. Despite the PSOE’s electoral setback, the two main parties 
achieved 73% of the total vote. The new executive did not alter the agenda of 
structural reforms, facing also major pressures from the EU to call for a bailout, 
after the downgrade of several Spanish banks’ credit ratings. Indeed, the hous-
ing bubble crisis was evolved to a financial crisis in the banking system, partic-
ularly in the local and regional semipublic saving banks (cajas de ahorro). 
Finally, the PP government accepted a bailout deal from the EU to the banking 
system under the form of a loan to recapitalize Spain’s weakest banks (De 
Guindos, 2016). In exchange, the government implemented new reforms and 
accepted European monitoring of Spanish banking reform. However, the state 
of the economy still experienced strong pressures during Rajoy’s first terms. 
Thus, public debt evolved from 69,5% (2011) to 99,3% of the GDP (2014), 
public deficit increased to -10,4% (2012), although budget cuts helped to re-
duce it to -5.9% (2014). In turn, unemployment peaked in 2013 to almost five 
million people, while the youth unemployment rate reached 56% by that time, 
although since 2014 it started to decrease slightly5. 
The poor economic performance during the first years of the Rajoy govern-
ment, and the deepening of the social consequences of the austerity policies 
fuelled political disaffection and electoral volatility (Cordero and Montero 
                                                             
4  In this respect, Castells (2011) argued that the exit from the Eurozone was the only way for 
the recovery of the Spanish economy. Similarly, Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca 
(2013) defended that Spain should leave the euro if the EU could not strengthen the politi-
cal integration. 
5  The source for all data reported in this paragraph is Eurostat. 
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2015, 350; Urquizu 2015). In 2012 and 2013 several surveys detected a dra-
matic collapse of the support for the two main Spanish parties, while the exist-
ing small parties did not really benefited from this (Rodríguez-Teruel 2013), 
suggesting a failure of the political supply in Spain (Fernández-Albertos 2015). 
In this context, the European election in May 2014 triggered an unprecedented 
electoral dealignment, with the appearance of new parties like Podemos and 
Ciudadanos on the EP, while the two main parties did not achieved even a 50% 
of the total vote. The electoral change came mainly from young, urban, politi-
cally-informed voters (Cordero and Montero 2015; Fernández-Albertos 2015). 
Amongst these voters, European attachment was significantly stronger com-
pared to the older electorate, although they seemed to express less interest in 
the European election (Rodríguez-Teruel 2014). Interestingly, Spain remained 
the largest country in the EU without Eurosceptic and far-right parties. 
3.  Theoretical Expectations and Data 
3.1   Expectations: Stability Rather than Change 
The financial crisis and its political consequences altered the position of Spain 
in the EU, as we have argued in the previous section. It changed from a story of 
economic success to a potential bailout, even though it would be ‘too big to 
fail’. This turn could not happen without affecting citizens’ perceptions of the 
political system and its legitimacy, although this negative effect should not 
necessarily be immediate (Freire and Moury 2015, 179). Some figures show 
that trust in government and its ability to manage the crisis steadily declined as 
the crisis hit the Spanish economy, in a more consistent way than in other Eu-
ropean countries (Roth 2009, 22). According to previous studies, the way citi-
zens perceive their national governments and institutions influences strongly 
their views and support for the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Sánchez-
Cuenca 2000). From a utilitarian perspective, this support is also explained by 
citizens’ perceptions of welfare gains from integration policies (Gabel 1998; 
Scharpf 1999). Hence, a regression in policy outcomes and the subsequent 
deterioration of the perception of national institutions might erode the support 
for the EU amongst citizens.  
However, these symptoms might not be necessarily appear among the politi-
cal elite. Parliamentarians’ attitudes and perceptions are elaborated and sustained 
upon stronger cognitive support, since they are better informed about European 
issues and have a strongest attachment to the EU (Müller et al. 2012; Sojka et al. 
2015; Freire and Moury 2015). Indeed, as political representatives know better 
the limits in the EU’s room for manoeuvre, their expectations about the EU role 
are more in line with reality. In countries like Spain, where the potential for uni-
lateral action is weaker, it might be even the case that such context of crisis could 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  220 
foster support for more integration, as the political elites might perceive that 
overcoming the current situation or avoiding new crisis in the future requires a 
supranational solution. Alternatively, an opposite evolution is also possible, since 
politicians could adopt more critic positions towards the EU in response to an 
increase of Euroscepticism among voters (Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
The main theoretical expectation in this article is that the attitudes of Span-
ish MPs towards the EU have not significantly changed during the crisis. This 
hypothesis is in line with the above mentioned arguments about elites’ higher 
cognitive competence and the political stability in parliament during the ob-
served period. Therefore, between 2004 and 2014, despite of the electoral 
changes mentioned in the previous section, the two main parties, both tradi-
tionally pro-EU, accounted for more than 80% of the seats at the lower house.6 
Yet this does not mean the disappearance of ideological and party differences. 
In fact, some studies (Ruiz Jiménez and Egea de Haro 2011; Vázquez et al. 
2014) have found differences in the pro-EU positions of PSOE and PP. For 
instance, the PSOE has traditionally shown a more federalist stance, while the 
PP has supported a view centred on the coincidence between EU and national 
interests. Hence, a second theoretical expectation is stable interparty divisions 
along ideological divides in both main parties, even though we do not expect 
that these party differences respond to a high politicization of EU issues at the 
national level. Consequently, they should not alter the general pattern of strong 
Europeanness amongst Spanish elites. 
3.2   Dimensions of Europeanness  
Our analysis focuses on the patterns of ‘Europeanness’ is defined here as a 
“composite set of perceptions and sentiments” that drives political elites deci-
sions and behaviours in the European integration (Best, Lengyel and Verzichel-
li 2012, 8). In this sense, the concept departs from more generic uses in cultural 
and identity studies, and captures several aspects of attitudes and preferences 
towards European integration. Following those authors, Europeanness becomes 
a multidimensional concept including the emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and 
projective-conative dimensions (ibid. 8). The emotive dimension refers to 
feelings of attachment and thus towards the European integration. The cogni-
tive-evaluative dimension includes attitudes dealing with the working of the 
EU and its scope of governance. Finally, the projective-conative dimension is 
based on the prospects and preferences for higher levels of European unifica-
tion and integration in the future. 
Hence, the empirical data will be developed in the three sets of indicators 
corresponding to the dimensions previously mentioned. First, attitudes of sup-
                                                             
6  The proportion of seats at the Spanish low chamber by PSOE and PP was 89% (2004), 92% 
(2008) and 84% (2011). 
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port for the EU, related to the emotive dimension (trust in EU institutions, 
attachment to the EU, and general support to the integration process). Second, 
opinions and preferences on working of EU institutions and their scope of 
governance (related to the cognitive dimension), including issues about how 
the EU faced the financial crisis. Finally, options regarding the future of the 
EU, including expectations and threats (conative dimension). 
3.3  Data 
Table 1:  Sample for Spain in ENEC-2014 
 MPs Inter-
views 
Gender  
Composition 
Experience:  
First Mandate 
Experience:  
more than one term 
% Freq. Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Partido Popular  
(PP) 52,9 40 13 27 4 15 9 12 
Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español (PSOE) 31,4 26 11 15 4 7 7 8 
Izquierda Unida-
Izquierda Plural 3,1 4 1 3 1 2 0 1 
Unión, Progreso y 
Democracia (UPyD) 1,4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Grupo Parlamentario 
Catalán (Convergencia i 
Unió, CiU) 
4,6 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 
Grupo Parlamentario 
Vasco (Partido Nacional-
ista Vasco, PNV) 
1,4 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Others 5,1 6 2 4 1 3 1 1 
Total (n) 350 81 29 52 11 29 18 23 
Source: Project ENEC (Spain); Real Dato (2016, 22). 
 
The empirical basis for our analysis comes from the data gathered by the two 
waves of the elite survey of the IntUne project (2007 and 2009) and the recent 
ENEC survey (2014) conducted amongst national parliamentarians from sever-
al European countries. This allows us to develop a comparative analysis across 
three parliamentary terms in Spain, covering the different periods described in 
the historical section. The content of the IntUne 2007 and 2009 elite surveys in 
Spain was presented and analysed in previous works (Jerez, Real-Dato and 
Vázquez 2010, 2015a). Regarding the 2014 ENEC survey, it basically repeated 
the structure and questions of the IntUne elite surveys, with some additional 
questions aimed at grasping the mood of national political representatives dur-
ing the crisis. The sample consisted of 81 MPs, following the research design 
of the project (see Table 1). The fieldwork was implemented between October 
21st 2014 and February 18th 2015 – though almost all but three interviews 
were conducted before the end of 2014. Most of the interviews were face-to-
face (76.5%), while the rest were conducted by telephone. In this article, the 
sample is weighted by three criteria: parliamentary group, gender and past 
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parliamentary experience (Table 1). The deviation rate respect to the designed 
sample is 1.4% for party, 4.2% for sex (with a slight underrepresentation of 
female MPs), and 0.5% for experience. 
Data collection took place two years after the formation of the PP govern-
ment with a strong parliamentarian majority. In this respect, the 2014 ENEC 
dataset differs from the two previous IntUne wages, conducted under PSOE 
governments. The party composition is indeed the main difference between 
both datasets. Our analysis controls for this factor when it comes to interpret 
significant differences across time, by distinguishing between PSOE and PP 
parliamentarians, or between left and right parties.  
4. Findings: The Stability of Spanish Parliamentary Elite’s 
Europeanness  
The empirical results are presented following the three sets of indicators em-
ployed to depict the patterns of Europeanness that we observed in the Spanish 
elite. Our analysis focus on the extent of change or stability detected in 2014 
compared to the previous survey waves. In those cases of where significant 
differences are found, we check whether party differences are responsible for 
these changes. 
4.1  The Emotive Dimension: Attitudes of Support to the EU 
Most aspects dealing with the emotive dimension of Spanish parliamentarians’ 
Europeanness does not show major changes during the period 2007-2014 (Fig-
ure 1). This general stability confirms the high level of support for European 
integration among Spanish MPs. Only the level of trust in the European Par-
liament (EP) has experienced a statistically significant increase from 6.3 in 
2007 to 7.0 in 2014, while in the case of the European Commission (EC) and 
the Council of the EU levels of trust remain approximately the same along the 
observed period. No changes are also observed in the differences between 
parties except in 2014, where a significant difference appear in the levels of 
trust among socialist MPs and those of the PP (6.1 against 7.4 points). 
The general positive stance is also observable in the indicator of attachment 
to the EU. Despite having significantly stronger attachment to the nation and to 
the region (Sojka et al. 2015), Spanish representatives are amongst those with 
highest levels of attachment to the EU (nine out of ten MPs consider them-
selves somewhat or very attached). There has been a steady (but not signifi-
cant) increase of four points between 2007 and 2014, mainly because of the 
evolution of those declaring being ‘very attached’ (ten points of differences), 
including the 53.1% of the whole group. Therefore, the hard times experienced 
by the Southern European countries and the controversy with the EU austerity 
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policies do not seems to have eroded the emotive linkage between the Spanish 
elite and the idea of Europe. Yet, the strongest expression towards Europe is 
larger amongst the PSOE parliamentarians (61.5% are very attached) compared 
to the PP (45%). 
In turn, the perception that the country has benefit from EU membership has 
remained mainly unaltered along time (Figure 1), being the percentage higher 
than that for the level of attachment to the EU. This is congruent with the pub-
lic opinion view, and confirms Spain as a country in which Europeanness 
seems clearly rooted on the positive assessment of EU membership. These data 
support the utilitarian explanation of attitudes towards the EU, explained main-
ly by the positive outcomes member states and their populations have experi-
enced from EU membership (Aspinwall 2007). 
Figure 1:  Trust, Attachment and Evaluation of the Overall Effect of EU 
Membership 
 
Note: The right-hand scale refers to the levels of trust in EU institutions, measured on a 0-10 
scale. The left-hand scale to the respective percentages of affirmative response in other varia-
bles. 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
However, these signs of strong support to the European integration coincide 
with a moderate expression of criticism towards the democratic functioning of 
EU institutions. Thus, almost 40% of the Spanish MPs declare in 2014 to be 
somewhat or very dissatisfied with the democracy in the EU. In this respect, 
the extent of democratic dissatisfaction is mostly explained by party affiliation, 
as 57.6% of the PSOE MPs declares a negative assessment regarding the issue 
(figures are similar for the other minor political parties), while 87.5 of the PP 
representatives express the opposite view. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, dissat-
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isfaction with the democratic working of the EU has worsened compared to the 
initial years of the crisis. The group of individuals declaring in 2014 to be very 
dissatisfied with democracy in the EU decreased by 11 points with respect to 
2009. Changes were significant both for the PP and the PSOE, though they run 
in different directions (satisfied MPs increase in the PP and decrease in the 
PSOE). Therefore, this deterioration of the views of the democratic working of 
EU institutions among Spanish MPs belonging to opposition parties, expresses 
a deeper insatisfaction with the balance of power within the EU, which during 
the crisis has clearly turned to favour creditor countries. This is confirmed by 
the significant increase in 2014 of the percentage of respondents who agreed 
with the idea that EU decisions did not take into account the interests of Spain 
(27.2% in 2009, 50% in 2014) (see below).  
Figure 2:  Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU (percentages) 
 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
However, these criticisms have not influenced the high levels of support for EU 
integration among Spanish MPs. Figure 3 confirms this assertion, since the 
distribution of opinions concerning whether the EU integration process should 
be strengthened or stopped, and the corresponding average scores (8.1 in 2007 
and 2009, 8.0 in 2014), have hardly changed during the crisis. Party identity 
makes again a distinction here when explaining the distribution of opinions 
(average differences are not statistically significant): while 42,3% of PSOE 
MPs are totally in favour (a score of 10 in a 0-10 scale) of strengthening the 
EU, most of the conservatives parliamentarians express different degrees of 
moderate support to this political view, with only 15% totally in favour. 
0,0%
10,0%
20,0%
30,0%
40,0%
50,0%
60,0%
Very dissatisfied Somewhat
dissatisfied
Somewhat satisfied Very satisfied
2009 2014
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  225 
Figure 3:  Support for the Strengthening of EU 
 
Note: Figures represent the proportion of MPs who situate themselves in a particular point 
within 0-10 scale, where 0 means 'EU integration has gone too far' and 10 'EU integration 
should be strengthened'. 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
4.3 The Cognitive-Evaluative Dimension: The Scope of EU 
Governance 
The evolution of MPs’ attitudes regarding the scope of governance that should 
be developed in the EU does not differ substantially from what has been ob-
served for the emotive dimension in the previous section. The main trend is 
continuity, although some slight changes along these years suggest again the 
relevance of the influence of the party competition. For the vast majority of the 
Spanish parliamentary elite (Figure 4), the EC must become the true govern-
ment of Europe (86.6%), while the powers of the EP should be strengthened 
(85.9%) as well as those of the European Central Bank (ECB) (71.1%). Re-
flecting a paradoxical position, an important proportion of respondents also 
supports the idea that states should remain central actors of the EU (65,5%). 
This contradictory position actually suggests an interesting evolution since the 
beginning of the crisis. Indeed, while in 2007 the support to a more parliamen-
tarian view of the European Union seemed to predominate (with 25 points of 
differences between support to strengthen the EP powers and declaring that 
states should keep their central position in the European governance), the fi-
nancial crisis has encouraged the support for a more executive view of the 
governance (based on the role of the EC) to the detriment of the role of states, 
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with more than 20 points of difference between both statements (Figure 4). In 
this vein, it is interesting that the support for the ECB role7 is stronger than for 
the role of the member states. In contrast with these opinions, the support to the 
employment of referendum to be used as a tool to take most important EU 
decisions is much weaker (52.6%). It does not seem that the consequences of 
the financial crisis could have altered the view in favour of direct democracy at 
the European level. Overall, there is a prevailing view amongst Spanish politi-
cal elites in favour of a state-like democracy for Europe, supported by the 
88.6% of the respondents. 
Figure 4:  Agreement About EU Governance Issues (percentages) 
 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
Party affiliation also influences decisively the views about which institutions 
should be strengthened. While almost half of the PSOE MPs disagree with the 
idea of keeping the states as central actors of the EU decision-making (46.2%), 
only a minor fraction of the PP group (12.5%) does not agree. On the contrary, 
PP representatives are less convinced than those of the PSOE about the idea of 
strengthening the EP powers (75.6% vs 96.2%). Similarly, two thirds of the 
PSOE group (66.7%, and all the other left-wing MPs in the chamber) agrees in 
                                                             
7  This item was not included in the IntUne surveys. 
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that the most important decisions concerning the EU should be taken by a 
majority of all European citizens. In contrast, only 30.8% (most of them agree-
ing somewhat) of the PP representatives agrees in this democratic approach. 
In contrast, the Eurozone crisis has clearly fuelled criticism regarding the 
role of states’ interest in the EU’s decision-making processes (Figure 4). In-
deed, the amount of respondents arguing that the EU level decisions do not 
usually take Spain’s interest into account has expanded during the observed 
period, increasing from 17.1% (in 2007) to 49.4% (in 2014). This is congruent 
with the strong view, shared by almost all the MPs, of the idea that the interest 
of some countries carries too much weight in the EU (supported by 93.8% in 
2014). Overall, this is an indicator of how Spanish elites have perceived the 
erosion of the position of the country (as well as other Southern European 
countries) in the EU compared to the central role of the richest countries.  
Figure 5:  Alternatives to Cope with the Financial Crisis in the EU (percentages 
of agreement) 
 
Source: IntUne (2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
The financial crisis forced the EU and their state members to take action to deal 
with the economic consequences of the crisis. The experience during this peri-
od may have affected opinions about how the EU should approach such chal-
lenges. On the one hand, there is a general consensus about need of EU finan-
cial aid to countries in difficulty (backed by 96.3% of the MPs). On the other 
hand, of the different alternatives to deal with the crisis in the EU, during the 
observed period Spanish MPs have reinforced their opinion in favour of the 
intervention led by the EU, to the detriment of state actions or the role of inter-
national institutions (Figure 5). Between 2009 and 2014, the support for an 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Intervention by
international
financial institutions
Intervention by the
EU
Coordinated action
by national
governments
Autonomous action
by national
governments
2009 2014
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  228 
intervention led by the EU increased (as a first or second choice amongst dif-
ferent alternatives) from 52.6% to 73.8%. In contrast, the choice for coordinat-
ed action by national governments decreased from 76.3% to 67.5%. This de-
cline is mainly focused on those considering this option as their first choice 
compared to the other alternatives (51,3% in 2009). Besides, the alternative of 
an intervention by international financial institutions has lost credit, decreasing 
14 percentage points, while an autonomous action by national governments is 
the last choice for most of the parliamentarians. 
These choices are somewhat influenced by party ideology, as PSOE MPs 
are less likely to back the 'states only' strategy compared to conservative repre-
sentatives. In 2014, the autonomous action by national governments was pre-
ferred as first or second choice by right-wing MPs (difference +24.4) as well as 
coordinated action of national governments (difference +11.7), while left-wing 
MPs gave stronger support to the intervention by the EU (difference +20.2) and 
to the role of the international fiscal institutions (difference +13.8). Moreover, 
the effect of party ideology is particularly outstanding when the MPs come to 
assess the role of EU institutions in the management of the Eurozone crisis. 
While PP representatives give a positive assessment of the EU, the EC and the 
ECB (around an average of 6.3 points on a scale 0-10), left-wing parliamentari-
ans express a worst opinion (average below 4 points). Finally, the ideological 
divide is more generally reflected in the MPs’ opinions about which should be 
the main aim of the EU. For left-wing representatives, this should be to provide 
better social security (83.9%), while conservative MPs conceive an EU focused 
on either making the European economy more competitive (31.8%) or on both 
economic and social aims (40.9%). 
The scope of governance also deals with multilevel policymaking, i.e., the 
changing relationship between actors situated at different territorial levels and 
how policy issues should be allocated amongst them (Jerez-Mir et al. 2010, 
49). In this respect, the preferences of political elites tend to follow the general 
pro-EU support pattern observed in previous pages, with some exceptions. In 
fact, while elites express more pro-EU positions in issues and policies dealing 
with transnational problems, they are less conclusive in those policies tradi-
tionally linked with domestic issues (Real-Dato et al. 2012; Real-Dato and 
Alarcón 2015). However, since 2009 there has been a an increase in the per-
centages of those respondents who prefer issues to be dealt at the EU level. We 
may interpret this as a consequence of the failure of national and subnational 
governments to respond to the main political challenges posed by the financial 
crisis. This effect is general (but not necessarily homogenous) across all kind of 
issues and policies, with two resulting patterns of evolution (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6:  Preferred Policy-Making Level for these Issues (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
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In those issues where political elites where divided regarding which level of 
policymaking should prevail (the EU, the national/regional level, or both), 
there has been an increasing gap in favour of the EU in immigration, environ-
ment, and fight against crime. Besides, in those policy areas where the pre-
ferred policymaking level was the nation or the region (fighting unemployment 
and health care policy), there has been a decline in support for those levels of 
government parallel with an increasing preference for the intervention of the 
EU (alone or in coordination with the other levels). One particular case is bank-
ing and finance regulation, where there is a strong consensus around the fun-
damental role of the EU in this policy area (84%).  
In some policy issues, preferences regarding which level must prevail in 
terms of policymaking are slightly affected by the party ideology (Real-Dato 
and Alarcón 2015). Therefore, left-wing MPs give stronger support to the EU 
level than the conservative representatives in issues like the unemployment 
policy (difference +33.8%), environment (+20.2%) or crime (+19.6%), while in 
other issues party differences are less relevant or non-existing. 
Figure 7:  Preferences in Military Policies: A National vs a European Army 
(percentages) 
 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
The main exception to this general trend to reinforce the preference for the EU 
as a central policymaking level is the security area, at least if we observe the 
declining support for a so-called European army (Figure 7). While in 2007 the 
preferences in this aspect were clearly in favour of European military coordina-
tion (with an EU army alone, or also in cooperation with national armies), only 
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seven years later the situation is much less clear, with divided opinions 
amongst Spanish MPs. We might interpret these changes as a domestic reaction 
towards the rise of new threats to the national security, particularly the destabi-
lization of the Northern African countries, like Libya or Egypt, since the start 
of the Arab Spring, or the crisis in Ukraine, and the failure of the EU to provide 
a unified strong response to these security issues. Party ideology might help to 
explain partially how this evolution has influenced the Spanish elite’s opinions. 
Even though the increase of the support for the national army is consistent in 
both left and right, the preferences for either an EU army alone or for the coex-
istence of armies (European and national) are substantively different along 
party lines: while the left-wing MPs are mostly in favour of a EU army com-
pared to the conservatives (48% against 23.3%), the development of a EU army 
in cooperation with national armies is the preferred option for the conservatives 
compared to the socialdemocrats (48.8% against 20%). 
4.3  The Projective-Conative Dimension: Perspectives on the Future 
of the EU 
Our analysis of the conative dimension includes three aspects of how Spanish 
parliamentarians perceive the future of the European project and its institutions: 
which of the policies traditionally linked to the core of state sovereignty should 
be fully Europeanized, which threats may endanger European integration, and 
how MPs foresee the future of the EU in the long term. These attitudes are 
particularly relevant to understand how the financial crisis and its consequences 
may have changed what elites expect from European integration. As Best, 
Lengyel and Verzichelli state, “the willingness to transfer control over im-
portant policy areas to a supranational European level rests in a ‘progressive’ 
perception of Europe’s destiny and future purpose” (2012, 9). 
Regarding the Europeanization of core sovereign policies (foreign policy, 
social security, and taxation), the financial crisis has had an impact in how 
Spanish politicians view the political evolution in these specific areas (Figure 
8). Generally, Spanish MPs’ preferences in most of these areas remain stable 
compared with those in 2007 and 2009. It is the case of developing a single 
foreign policy for all the EU members regarding non-EU states (48,1% strongly 
in favour, 43,2% somewhat in favour), or setting a common social security for 
the EU members (28,8% strongly in favour, 58,8% somewhat in favour). There 
are not obviously strong differences along party lines in these policies. But in 
the taxation area, there has been a significant change during the observed peri-
od. Therefore, if in 2007 the proportion of those in favour of a unified tax sys-
tem was slightly below 75%, in 2014 such percentage increased up to a 85.6% 
(40.5% strongly in favour, 45.6% somewhat in favour, including almost all 
left-wing MPs). In the same vein, there is a strong support for developing a 
system of collectivising the national debt through the issuance of Eurobonds 
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(39.5% strongly in favour, 53.9% somewhat in favour). In these policies, party 
lines make some slight differences in the intensity of preferences (strongly vs 
somewhat in favour) rather than between supporting or opposing the alterna-
tives, being left-wing MPs those who show a more favourable position for 
common European policies. 
Figure 8: Policy Preferences in 10 Years (percentages) 
 
Source: IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
There are also some signs of change in the perceived threats to the EU. In par-
ticular, some threats have gained relevance since 2007. The more relevant is 
connected to the financial crisis itself and its political consequences: two thirds 
of the respondents think economic differences among states is a big threat to 
the sustainability of the European project in its current form, while the corre-
sponding percentage was only 42.1% in 2007. The economic effects of the 
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crisis may also spill over the political arena, in the form of the growth of na-
tionalist and state-centred positions. Therefore, a 74.1% of the MPs consider a 
big threat that some countries put its national interest first, to the detriment of 
the collective view of the European project. This second indicator was already 
high in 2009 (unfortunately, it was not included in the 2007 survey). This view 
of economic inequalities and self-interested positions in states as threats to the 
EU is not corresponded when considering other issues. Therefore, only 39.2% 
of the interviewees considered the competition from the emerging countries as 
a threat; 25.6% thought the same about immigration from non EU countries, 
and 22.4% considered the enlargement of the EU to Turkey a likely danger. 
These positions clearly depend on the party affiliation of the respondent, with 
left-wing representatives being mostly concerned with economic inequality, 
state self-interest and competition from emerging countries, while right-wing 
MPs were more likely to be concerned with the other issues. 
Conversely, almost all Spanish MPs dismiss the idea that the EU itself could 
become a potential threat for the national culture and identity (only 2.5% 
agreed), welfare state (13.9%), economic growth (12.7%) or the quality of 
democracy (4.9%). 
Figure 9:  EU Long-Term Perspectives: In 10 Years (percentages) 
 
Source: ENEC (2014) elite surveys. 
 
Finally, Figure 9 shows the results concerning the views of Spanish MPs about 
the future general situation of the EU in 10 years. Opinions among Spanish 
MPs are definitely optimistic, though levels of optimism differ depending on 
the aspect of the future in consideration. Thus, while about 85% percent of 
respondents were confident that in 10 years the EU will be politically more 
integrated and its economy will be more robust, this percentages was lower 
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when considering the future of the EU as a geopolitical power or that differ-
ences between citizens (60.3% and 68.4%, respectively, were optimistic about 
these issues).  
5.  Conclusion: Stability in the Europeanness of Spanish 
Parliamentary Elite during the Crisis 
This article has offered an overview of several aspects of the Spanish political 
elite’s attitudes towards the EU. We have employed the multidimensional 
concept of Europeanness to integrate these views into a common comparative 
analytical framework. The main results confirm that the longstanding pro-
European consensus among Spanish national representatives (Jerez-Mir et al. 
2015b) has remained almost unalterable after the harsh period of financial 
crisis and political turbulence. And in those few cases where significant chang-
es in the main patterns of perceptions and expectations are detected, these 
changes usually reveal a strengthening of the support to for a more federalist 
view of the European project. Therefore, in 2014 the average level of trust in 
the EP among Spanish MPs was significantly higher than in 2009. Similarly, 
the percentages of respondents who prefer that key policy areas of contempo-
rary governance, particularly those that are at the core of the current European 
debate such as taxation, finance, immigration, and environment, are decided 
exclusively by EU institutions increased in 2014 with respect to 2009. Besides, 
this has also become the preferred alternative for a key policy area in the do-
mestic arena such as fighting unemployment. In contrast, one of the more rele-
vant changes comparing to previous results (in the 2007-2009 IntUne project 
data) is the deterioration of the support to the national/regional level of gov-
ernment as crucial reference points for decision-making (in contrast to what 
was observed by Jerez-Mir et al. 2010, 51). However, some negative percep-
tions have gained relevance during the last years, related to the perception that 
European decision-makers or the decision structure of the EU do not take 
enough into account the interests of those countries, such as Spain, more af-
fected by the crisis, while the view that some countries carry too much weight 
on EU decision making still persists. This is in line with the perception of 
member states' self-interest and economic inequalities as the most important 
threats to European integration. 
The pro-EU positions among Spanish MPs is also evidenced when looking 
at their views of the future of the EU in 10 years, where a great majority be-
lieves Europe will be more integrated and prosperous; and the minority repre-
sented by those who think the EU constitutes a danger for the country's cultur-
al, economic or political systems.   
This Euro-optimism of the Spanish parliamentary elite may also have less 
positive reading if we look at it from the perspective of the representative role 
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played by Spanish parliamentary elites. As we have explained in previous 
pages, this pro-EU consensus was built upon the stability of the representation 
of the main political parties (even though some changes in the parliamentary 
balance between PSOE and PP). But this stability has run in parallel to a dete-
rioration of some aspects of the (traditionally positive) attitudes of Spanish 
citizens towards the EU. Such deterioration has affected mostly to the levels of 
trust in EU institutions, support for European integration, or the benefits ob-
tained from the EU membership (Real-Dato 2015). This differential evolution 
of the views of citizens seems to be producing an increasing gap between these 
and their political representatives. This gap might be partly caused by the cog-
nitive differences between elites and the general public mentioned at the begin-
ning of this article. But also, it could be an expression of what Peter Mair has 
called the dilemma between responsibility and responsiveness (2013, 140). 
According to this, the emphasis on responsibility by traditional parties to the 
detriment of responsiveness to the electorate might open a growing divide 
between “parties which claim to represent, but don’t deliver, and those which 
deliver, but are no longer seen to represent” (Mair 2013, 141). Unsurprisingly, 
the increasing gap between the positions of Euro-optimistic political elites and 
Euro-critical citizens has developed during a time when both PSOE and PP 
governments implemented very unpopular austerity policies. In this context, 
parties' emphasis on responsibility may have eroded the popular basis of the 
permissive consensus that has prevailed in Spain since its entry in the EEC in 
1986. It could also be argued that the persistence of this gap between parties 
and citizens could pave the way for new parties or political actors thriving on 
popular disatisfaction with the economic and political situation and with a 
nationalist or even Eurosceptic agenda. This might help to understand the elec-
toral breakthrough of a new party like Podemos in the 2014 European election, 
which based its campaign in exploiting a highly critical discourse with the 
political class and the austerity policies imposed by the EU, and claiming the 
reinforcement of the role of the national institutions in Europe (Rodríguez-
Teruel et al. 2016). This raises interesting prospects about the implications of 
party system change in Spain for the European project. Will the new MPs com-
ing from the new parties – mostly from Podemos – accommodate to traditional 
patterns of Europeanness? Or will they transform them aiming to respond to 
dissatisfied voters if the EU’s output-oriented legitimacy continues to deterio-
rate? 
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